You plan to implement a two-tier CA hierarchy with an offline root C

###BeginCaseStudy###
Topic 7, Contoso, Ltd Case D
Overview
Contoso, Ltd., is a manufacturing company that makes several different components that are used in
automobile production. Contoso has a main office in Detroit, a distribution center in Chicago, and
branch offices in Dallas, Atlanta, and San Diego.
The contoso.com forest and domain functional level are Windows Server 2008 R2. All servers run
Windows Server 2012 R2, and all client workstations run Windows 7 or Windows 8. Contoso uses
System Center 2012 Operations Manager and Audit Collection Services (ACS) to monitor the
environment. There is no certification authority (CA) in the environment.
Current Environment
The contoso.com domain contains the servers as shown in the following table:

Contoso sales staff travel within the United States and connect to a VPN by using mobile devices to
access the corporate network. Sales users authenticate to the VPN by using their Active Directory
usernames and passwords. The VPN solution also supports certification-based authentication.
Contoso uses an inventory system that requires manually counting products and entering that count
into a database. Contoso purchases new inventory software that supports wireless handheld scanners
and several wireless handheld scanners. The wireless handheld scanners run a third party operating
system that supports the Network Device Enrollment Service (NDES).
Business Requirements
Security
The wireless handheld scanners must use certification-based authentication to access the wireless
network.
Sales users who use mobile devices must use certification-based authentication to access the VPN.
When sales users leave the company, Contoso administrators must be able to disable their VPN access
by revoking their certificates.
Monitoring
All servers must be monitored by using System Center 2012 Operating Manager. In addition to
monitoring the Windows operating system, you must collect security logs from the CA servers by using
ACS, and monitor the services that run on the CA and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) servers, such as
certification authority and web services.
Technical Requirements
CA Hierarchy
Contoso requires a two-tier CA hierarchy. The CA hierarchy must include a stand-alone offline root and
two Active Directory-integrated issuing CAs: one for issuing certificates to domain-joined devices, and
one for issuing certificates to non-domain-joined devices by using the NDES. CRLs must be published to
two web servers: one in Detroit and one in Chicago.
Contoso has servers that run Windows Server 2012 R2 to use for the CA hierarchy. The servers are
described in the following table:

The IT security department must have the necessary permissions to manage the CA and CRL servers. A
domain group named Corp-IT Security must be used for this purpose. The IT security department users
are not domain admins.
Fault Tolerance
The servers that host the CRL must be part of a Windows Network Load Balancing (NLB) cluster. The CRL
must be available to users in all locations by using the hostname crl.contoso.com, even if one of the
underlying web servers is offline.

###EndCaseStudy###

You administer an Active Directory Domain Services environment. There are no certification authorities
(CAs) in the environment.
You plan to implement a two-tier CA hierarchy with an offline root CA.
You need to ensure that the issuing CA is not used to create additional subordinate CAs.
What should you do?

A.
In the CAPolicy.inf file for the issuing CA, enter the following constraint:
PathLength=1

B.
In the CAPolicy.inf file for the root CA, enter the following constraint:
PathLength=1

C.
In the CAPolicy.inf file for the root CA, enter the following constraint:
PathLength=2

D.
In the CAPolicy.inf file for the issuing CA, enter the following constraint:
PathLength=2

Explanation:
You can use the CAPolicy.inf file to define the PathLength constraint in the Basic Constraints extension
of the root CA certificate. Setting the PathLength basic constraint allows you to limit the path length of
the CA hierarchy by specifying how many tiers of subordinate CAs can exist beneath the root. A
PathLength of 1 means there can be at most one tier of CAs beneath the root. These subordinate CAs
will have a PathLength basic constraint of 0, which means that they cannot issue any subordinate CA
certificates.
Windows Server 2008 R2 CAPolicy.inf Syntax
http://blogs.technet.com/b/askds/archive/2009/10/15/windows-server-2008-r2-capolicy-infsyntax.aspx